Jurisdiction of (Indian) Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to Sit In On — and Pass On — the Validity of Subordinate Legislation or Executive Decisions

Until now,  a controversy has raged as to whether the (Indian) Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is empowered to sit in on — or pass on — the validity of subordinate legislation or executive decisions.

2.          The nearest that the Tribunal has come to holding that it has the power to apply the doctrine of  ultra vires  was in  Amar Dye-Chem Ltd v ITO [1983] 3 SOT 384 (Bom)(SB),  in which a 5-Member Special Bench held that if a statutory provision has been declared to be  ultra vires  by a court of competent jurisdiction (i.e.,  any of the High Courts or the Supreme Court),  the Tribunal has to respect the law so laid down by that court,  with the result that  the statutory provision declared to be  ultra vires  has to be ignored by the Tribunal.  In other words,  the Tribunal stopped short of holding that it had jurisdiction to strike down as being  ultra vires,   any statutory provision.  

3.          However,  the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal had recently,  in the case of  Reliance Industries Ltd v DDI (International Taxation) [2005] 3 SOT 501 (Mum),  occasion to consider this issue.  In that case,  the Government of India in its Ministry of Finance had,  vide  a communication of July 21,  1997,  conveyed to the taxpayer —
(i)     its approval of a loan agreement under which the taxpayer had agreed to borrow moneys from sources outside India and
(ii)     that,  consequent to such approval,  the interest,  commission and fees payable by the taxpayer on the moneys so borrowed by it was exempt from withholding tax under Section 10(15)(iv)(f) of the Income-tax Act,  1961.  
Subsequently,  vide a letter dated April 12,  1999 addressed by the Deputy Director (ECB) of the  Government of India in its  Ministry of Finance to the taxpayer,  the exemption from withholding tax aforesaid was effectively withdrawn,  in the following terms :
     
“
          ……….

2.     Further,  it has been noted that the ECB funds raised above had not been utilized for the specified end uses which is one of the essential terms of the ECB approval for availing relevant exemptions under section 10(15)(iv)(f) of Income-tax Act,  1961.  You are,  therefore,  not entitled to any tax benefit in terms of the above provision of the Income-tax Act,  1961.
……….
”

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the executive was empowered to impose a condition (viz.,  the condition of “end use”) not laid down in the statute.  In what can only be described as a path-breaking ruling,  the Tribunal held as follows :

          “
     17.     ……….  On careful reading of the above decisions it is implicit that the Tribunal does have the power to deal with the validity of such rules or notification and by applying the doctrine of “reading down” can strike down such rules if held to be in contradiction with the provisions of the statute itself.  The gist of all the above decisions is that the rules are made only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act which cannot be taken away or whittle down the effect conferred by the statute.  With the result we hereby agree with the contentions of ld. A.R. that the ITAT has both,  the power and duty,  to deal with such rules or notification and decide whether the same are in agreement with the main provisions of the statute.  In view of above discussion,  in the present appeal,  now we have to decide the validity of the withdrawal of exemption as has been done by the subordinate competent authority.  ……….
”

4.          Consequent to its above ruling,  the Tribunal proceeded to hold,  inter alia,  that,  “considering the totality of the facts,  circumstances,  conditions of the scheme,  evidences of utility of the funds and the legal matrix of the case;  the withdrawal of the exemption was unwarranted”.

5.          Of course,  it might be argued that the above ruling is  obiter,  at least insofar as subordinate legislation is concerned,  having regard to the fact that the issue before the Tribunal was whether the Tribunal was empowered to strike down as invalid,  an executive decision which was inconsistent with the statutory enactment under which such decision was purportedly made.  However,  even if such an argument is upheld,  the ruling will nonetheless strengthen the hands of a future Bench for holding that the Tribunal is invested with the jurisdiction to strike down as  ultra vires,  even subordinate legislation.